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SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE SEARCH 
FOR ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
MELVIN J DUBNICK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Use the word ‘corporation’ in mixed company — that is, any group comprised 
of more than accountants, MBAs, attorneys or economists — and the image you are 
likely to evoke will be that of a large, impersonal business enterprise headed by a 
board of directors, managed by a team of executives headed by a well-paid CEO, with 
millions of customers, thousands of employees, offices throughout the world, and 
perhaps tens of thousands of big and small investors who claim some stake in the 
company. Say the name of a particular corporation — for example, Microsoft, Enron, 
Toyota, WorldCom, Sony, Tyco, or Apple — in that same group and the conjured up 
images are likely to be as diverse and opined as the group itself. 
Taken out of mixed company and placed in context, the modern corporation’s 
image becomes clearer in purpose if not in form or reputation. At least within the 
jurisdictional sphere, where Anglo-American norms and interests predominate,1 a 
consensus view has emerged among those whose livelihood depends on these salient 
social-cultural-economic-political actors. This consensus holds that the raison d’être 
of corporations — their very existence and success — is tied to their pursuit of value 
on behalf of shareholders. That is the pervasive and defining view among students and 
practitioners of the modern corporate arts and sciences. Moreover, that consensus is 
                                                
1 Despite the awkwardness of the label ‘Anglo-American’, I intend for it to encompass those nations 
and cultures (social, legal, political and economic) associated with the British governance tradition. 
Alternative labels (eg, ‘Commonwealth’, ‘Anglican’, etc) might have been used, so the choice is 
offered arbitrarily and with apologies to readers. 
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as strongly held by corporate critics as it is by its defenders.2 While this consensus 
view of corporate purpose is not without its historical and intellectual challengers, the 
practical result of its dominance has been to focus and set parameters around debates 
about corporate behaviour and possible solutions to corporate governance problems in 
the Anglo-American context. As that context has become both increasingly more 
complex and globally hegemonic, however, that consensus has become more 
problematic both within and outside its formal jurisdictions. This has been made 
especially clear with the passage and implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.3 
While designed as a politically expedient response to a moral panic fed by 
media frenzy,4 Sarbanes-Oxley has brought to the fore fundamental issues about the 
nature of the modern corporate form that have lain fallow for nearly a century among 
Anglo-American scholars. The debate about the nature of the corporation was pre-
emptively dismissed as mere scholastic banter by no less an authority than John 
Dewey in 1926,5 and has only intermittently been revisited.6 The argument presented 
here attempts to reopen those discussions with the intent of reasserting a perspective 
on the purpose of corporations that allows us to assess corporate governance reforms 
such as Sarbanes-Oxley. The perspective I put forward is anchored in the contention 
                                                
2 See, eg, Edward S Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (1981); Christopher D Stone, 
Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (1975). 
3 Pub L No 107–204, 116 Stat 745 (2002) (‘Sarbanes-Oxley’). 
4 Jose Gabilondo, ‘Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes-Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-
Sheet Arrangements’ (2006) 36 Seton Hall Law Review 781. 
5 See John Dewey, ‘The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality’ (1926) 35 Yale Law 
Journal 655; Bryant Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ (1928) 37 Yale Law Journal 283. The contemporary 
reader will be surprised at the ‘post-modern’ and Foucauldian nature of the argument presented in both 
these works. 
6 See Reuven S Avi-Yonah, ‘The Cynical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical 
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 767; 
Phillip I Blumberg, ‘The Corporate Personality in American Law: A Summary Review’ (1990) 38 
American Journal of Comparative Law 49; Tokusuke Kitagawa, ‘Some Reflections on the Corporate 
Theory, Including a Japanese Perspective’ (1960) Duke Law Journal 535; Janet McLean, ‘Personality 
and Public Law Doctrine’ (1999) 49 University of Toronto Law Journal 123; William W Bratton, ‘The 
New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law 
Review 1471. 
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that modern governance — public as well as private — is at its core based on some 
form of accountability. Accountability-based governance, in this view, emerged 
historically as an effective response to the central dilemma facing secular rulers of the 
embryonic nation-state in the late medieval period — that is, how to maintain and 
sustain authority over autonomous subjects who were becoming increasingly aware of 
their capacity for discretionary action. The modern corporate form, I will argue, 
developed as part of that solution in Anglo-Norman England, and it is in light of those 
historical roots that contemporary corporate governance and corporate governance 
reforms efforts should be assessed. 
 
I ‘PURPOSE’ AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 
The assessment of a law or public policy can be approached in three ways: 
prospectively, retrospectively or perspectively. The prospective approach, common to 
many professional policy analysis efforts, is to assess the potential or possibility of a 
proposal. It reflects the role of assessment as part of the policy design process. 
Retrospective approaches, in contrast, are generally associated with technical or 
critical evaluations of past performance of the program or its implementers. In 
seeking to undercover the underlying logic or ontological context of a policy, 
perspective assessments are most helpful for analytic and critical tasks.  
In this chapter I undertake a perspective assessment of Sarbanes-Oxley with 
the objective of measuring the law and its implementation against a model of the 
‘historical purpose’ for which corporate governance regulation and reform legislation 
has been developed over the past millennium. As sweeping and daunting as that task 
might seem, it proves feasible because in Anglo-American law the corporate form is 
historically and inherently linked to the primary purpose of modern governance: 
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accountability. As a first step in this (or any) assessment, we must distinguish among 
the various foci that might draw our attention. There are several candidate focal points 
for a policy assessment. In theory, at least, all formalised laws and policies are 
expected to have an explicit statement of intent — the goals or objectives its authors 
sought to address — and where these are clear they provide the grounds for 
assessment of programs associated with those intentions. This seems simple enough, 
except for the practical matter that intent is rarely so clear, especially in matters of 
law and policy.7 A second focus for assessments could be the functional role played 
by a set of policies or laws. Among political scientists, for example, public policies 
and programs are evaluated as much for their symbolic value as for their intended 
impacts,8 and the more proactive would regard direct government actions in some 
policy arenas (eg, civil rights, environmental protection) to be a functional means to 
greater ends.9 Third, a more familiar focus for policy analysts are the impacts that a 
policy or other government action has on various segments of the environment.10 
Benefit–cost analyses are at their core measurements of the projected impacts 
(positive and negative) of a proposal, and studies of the implications of a given 
regulation or tax code change or interest rate increase on a segment of the population 
also fit this category. A fourth focal point of assessment is the unintended, secondary 
or delayed consequences derived from the laws, policies or programs.11 
One focus rarely considered is that of purpose, and here we look beyond 
immediate intent and function (which are the most closely related) to the underlying 
                                                
7 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999). 
8 Murray J Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (1964); Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic 
Action: Mass Arousal and Quiesence (1971). 
9 Julian Le Grand, ‘Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy’ (1997) 26 
Journal of Social Policy 149. 
10 Hidehiko Ichimura and Christopher R Taber, ‘Direct Estimation of Policy Impacts’ (Working Paper, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000). 
11 Steven M Gillon, That’s Not What We Meant to Do: Reform and Its Unintended Consequences in 
Twentieth-Century America (2000). 
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— and yet overarching — rationale of the policy effort. This assessment standard is 
best explained by example. The intent of a government campaign to deal with a 
national AIDS epidemic in a developing country is to prevent it spread and treat the 
infected, but in the process it functions as a means for improving the capacity of 
health and social services at the community level. Its impact on specific population 
segments — for example, children under the age of six, members of a certain ethnic 
community — is also a subject of assessment, as is the program’s long-term 
consequential impact on government legitimacy. The purpose of the program, 
however, is the meta-goal of improving the quality of life for all, and the question 
becomes: how does this particular anti-AIDS campaign measure up against that 
objective? In a comparable way, the purpose of any contemporary US national 
security policy (assuming the conventional perspective) is maintaining world order, 
and a particular government decision (eg, the invasion of Iraq in 2003) can be 
assessed against that higher standard as well as evaluated according to its intent (eg, 
to depose Saddam Hussein), function (what it contributes to stabilising — or not — 
the Middle East), impact (the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a result), and 
consequence (the bolstering of anti-American sentiment throughout the world). The 
seeming indifference to purpose by most analysts is, in part, a result of consensus that 
is typically associated with meta-goals within a dominant political ontology at any 
particular time and place. That is the case with any anti-AIDS program under 
globalised conditions across populations where previous experience with the epidemic 
generates as much empathy as sympathy for the afflicted. Where that consensus has 
broken down — as in the case of US policy in Iraq — the issue of purpose comes to 
the fore and becomes part of the overall assessment and debate over the situation. 
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The relevance of all this to the subject of this chapter, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
emerges as we approach the fifth anniversary of the law and face a growing number 
of assessments that raise a range of issues. Some of the studies, many published 
immediately after passage of the Act, focus on the intentions of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Characterised as ‘legislated ethics’12 and ‘legislated risk-management’,13 it was 
generally assessed as a means for improving corporate governance through tougher 
disclosure requirements and other mechanisms.14 As the law was implemented, more 
attention was given to the functional implications of Sarbanes-Oxley. Some focused 
on how it became a vehicle for extending the global reach of US market regulation,15 
while others considered its role in promoting the nationalisation of US corporate 
governance policy.16 Whether intended or not, Sarbanes-Oxley also has begun to 
                                                
12 Howard Rockness and Joanne Rockness, ‘Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
Impact on Corporate America’ (2005) 57 Journal of Business Ethics 31; Margaret L Gagne, Joanne H 
Gavin and Gregory J Tully, ‘Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Ethics: Exploring a Framework’ 
(2005) 110 Business and Society Review 181. 
13 Colin Linsley, ‘Auditing, Risk Management and a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World’ (2003) 24 Review of 
Business 21. 
14 Leonard M Baynes, ‘Just Pucker and Blow? An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of 
Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2002) 76 St John’s Law Review 875; Michael 
A Perino, ‘Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) 76 St John’s Law Review 671; Larry E Ribstein, ‘Market Vs 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) 28 
Journal of Corporation Law 1; William W Bratton, ‘Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
Versus Principles Versus Rents’ (2003) 48 Villanova Law Review 1023; John C Coffee, ‘The Attorney 
as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 1293; Lawrence A 
Cunningham, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (and It Just Might 
Work)’(2003) 35 Connecticut Law Review 915; Megan N Gates, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Non-US 
Issuers: Considerations for International Companies’ (2003) 10 Journal of Commercial Biotechnology 
40; Marshall A Geiger and Porcher L Taylor, ‘CEO and CFO Certifications of Financial Information’ 
(2003) 17 Accounting Horizons 357. 
15 Gates, above n 14; Detlev F Vagts, ‘Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance Law’ (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 289; Huddson T Hollister, ‘“Shock Therapy” for 
Aktiengesellschaften: Can the Sarbanes-Oxley Certification Requirements Transform German 
Corporate Culture, Practice and Prospects?’ (2005) 25 Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business 453; Lori V Ryan, ‘Corporate Governance and Business Ethics in North America: The State 
of the Art’ (2005) 44 Business and Society 40. 
16 Michael E Clark, ‘Hamstrung or Properly Calibrated? Federalism and the Appropriate Role of 
Government in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World’ (2004) 1 International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance 385; Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Journal 1521; Roberta Romano, ‘Quack Corporate Governance’ 
(2005) 28 Regulation 36. 
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function as the standard for best practices in non-public firms.17 Impact studies of 
Sarbanes-Oxley have also proliferated, covering the obvious targets such as CEOs, 
CFOs and corporate directors,18 to its influence on management in general,19 as well 
as accountancy, record keeping practices and auditing within the firm.20 Among the 
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, the policy’s role in raising the cost of doing 
business,21 as well as its role in reshaping the very nature of the corporate culture,22 
are starting to be scrutinised. 
What has not been examined as yet is how Sarbanes-Oxley measures up to the 
historical purpose of corporate governance policy. This is in large part due to the 
general indifference to such purpose inherent in the consensus discussed earlier. To 
remedy this I begin by making explicit what that purpose is, by uncovering the 
historical roots and development of those governance policies and their ties to a 
particular political ontology highlights the need for accountability. My goal is to 
measure Sarbanes-Oxley by applying a framework that allows us to critically assess 
various approaches to improving corporate accountability. 
                                                
17 Dan R Dalton and Catherine M Dalton, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation and the Private Company: If 
Not a Marriage, Then Certainly an Engagement’ (2005) 26 Journal of Business Strategy 7. 
18 Geiger and Taylor, above n 14; Ruth V Aguilera, ‘Corporate Governance and Director 
Accountability: An Institutional Comparative Perspective’ (2005) 16 British Journal of Management 
S39; Jack Keenan, ‘Corporate Governance in UK/USA Boardrooms’ (2004) 12 Corporate Governance 
172; James S Linck, Jeffry M Netter and Tina Yang, ‘The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and Its Era, on the Supply and Demand for Directors’, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902665>. 
19 Harvey Coustan et al, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley: What It Means to the Marketplace’ (2004) 197 Journal of 
Accountancy 43. 
20 Bratton, ‘Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting’, above n 14; David L Schwarzkopf and Hugh M 
Miller, ‘Early Evidence of How Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Affects Individuals and their 
Workplace Relationships’ (2005) 110 Business and Society Review 21; David O Stephens, ‘The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Records Management Implications’ (2005) 15 Records Management Journal 98; 
James A Tackett, Fran Wolf and Gregory A Claypool, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley and Audit Failure: A Critical 
Examination’ (2004) 19 Managerial Auditing Journal 340; James A Tackett, Fran Wolf and Gregory A 
Claypool, ‘Internal Control under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Critical Examination’ (2006) 21 Managerial 
Auditing Journal 317. 
21 William J Carney, ‘The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private”’ 
(2006) 55 Emory Law Journal 141; Larry E Ribstein, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley after Three Years’ (University 
of Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper, University of Illinois College of Law, 2005). 
22 Michael Power, ‘Organizations and Auditability: A Theory’ (Paper presented at the SCORE 
Conference, Stockholm, 2005). 
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II UNCOVERING THE HISTORICAL PURPOSE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Origins are always obscure. If we endeavour to explain the genesis of any event 
that happens in our own days and seemingly before our very eyes, a scientific 
discovery, a new religion, a war, a revolution, we never get back to the simple 
fountain-head, the initial impulse whence it is derived. The stream we follow 
upwards brings us at length to difficult marshes and underground pools, never to 
a clear spring. If that is true of near events, how much harder is the task to trace 
the origins of social phenomena in the unknown and ever receding past.23 
 
MacIver’s observation provides fair warning about an exercise such as the present 
one, for in seeking a historical foundation for the purpose of corporate governance 
policy we are heading into murky waters. 
 
A The Modern Corporate Form as Hybrid 
The first thing to note is that there are three major claims to the parentage of 
the modern corporate form, one ecclesiastic,24 one Italian, and another English.25 Each 
reflects a distinct view of that form as a legal actor. 
An early corporate form, with roots in Roman law,26 is found in medieval 
canon law as a means for dealing with the status of church property that was held in 
perpetuity but used by individuals in their ecclesiastic roles. Thus, an artificial and 
passive entity was necessary as a legal instrument representing a collectivity (the 
church or an order) that would transcend the actions of its membership.27 This 
canonical form is manifest today in approaches that stress that the corporation is 
                                                
23 Robert M MacIver, The Modern State (1926) 25. 
24 Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983). 
25 M Schmitthoff, ‘The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company’ (1939) 3 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 74. Each of these forms corresponds with a corporate ‘personality’ type in American law: see 
Blumberg, above n 6. Blumberg also discusses the recent emergence of a fourth corporate personality 
that regards it as a composite of corporate entities. See also Stone, above n 2. 
26 F R W I Maitland, ‘Corporation Sole’ (1900) 16 Law Quarterly Review 335. 
27 Berman, above n 24; Stone, above n 2, 11–13. 
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nothing more than a ‘legal fiction’ (persona ficta)28 with an existence (ie, legal 
standing) independent of its members. 
The Italian — actually Genoan — claim regards the modern corporation as an 
outgrowth of a particular joint-stock company form, developed by debt holders to 
handle privately-assumed public debts that spread from 15th century Genoa northward 
throughout the continent and then England. Unlike the passive canonical form, this 
corporate form is an active contractual association of individual shareholders with a 
common (most often fiduciary) interest.29 
Alternatively, a case is made that the modern corporate form evolved from 
partnerships and chartered guilds and related entities of 10th and 11th century England. 
What evolved was the corporate form perceived as a distinct autonomous (‘rights-
and-duty-bearing’) entity with ‘real’ interests, such as proving charitable services or 
the pursuit of profits in an open market where it competes with other ‘real’ persons 
(corporate and otherwise).30 
The modern business corporation that is the subject of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
related laws is perhaps best seen as a hybrid of all three forms, for while it has legal 
standing as an artificial person and the structural characteristics of the joint-stock 
form, its existence is closely tied to the same ‘realist’ logic that forms the foundation 
of municipalities, associations and other collectivities recognised as active persons 
under law.31 The development of that hybrid genre was nowhere more advanced than 
                                                
28 See George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — I’ (1908) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
and American Law Register 131. 
29 George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — II’ (1909) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register 216. 
30 While I use a narrative that focuses on Anglo-Norman England, for reasons that become clear below, 
the theory behind this view is associated with the German political theorist and historian Gierke: see 
Otto F V Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (1958). For an effective attempt at outlining 
Gierke’s theory as it relates to corporate forms: see George F Deiser, ‘The Juristic Person — III’ 
(1909) 57 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 300. 
31 Leonard W Hein, ‘The British Business Company: Its Origins and Its Control’ (1963) 15 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 134. 
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in England and its colonial offspring, and for that reason the ‘stream we follow 
upwards’ (in MacIver’s terms) is located in the British Isles. That ‘genre’ was most 
clearly defined by US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall in Dartmouth 
College v Woodward in passages worth quoting at length: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, 
and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual 
succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single 
individual. They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property, 
without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual 
conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the 
purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, 
that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual 
succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular 
object, like one immortal being. But this being does not share in the civil government 
of the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created. Its immortality no 
more confers on it political power, or a political character, than immortality would 
confer such power or character on a natural person. It is no more a state instrument, 
than a natural person exercising the same powers would be. … The objects for which 
a corporation is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote. 
They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the 
consideration, and in most cases, the sole consideration of the grant.32 
 
Two important points about Chief Justice Marshall’s definition need highlighting. 
First, the corporation in question, Dartmouth College, was a specific type of 
corporation — an ‘eleemosynary institution’ engaged in the charitable work of 
providing education. Second, although business corporations do exist at the time of 
the decision (1819), it would be 25 more years before the British Parliament passes 
the Joint Stock Companies Act 184433 (‘Companies Act’) that provides for 
incorporation through a registration process rather than through royal charters or acts 
of legislation.34 Thus, despite strong associations with business enterprises, the 
                                                
32 17 US 518, 637–8 (1819). 
33 See John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary 
Idea (2003). 
34 There are two other means for an entity to assume corporate status. One is through a finding in 
common law court where a non-corporate entity might be given de facto standing as a corporation to 
facilitate judgment (see Maitland, above n 26); and the other is through ‘implication’ via legislation or 
other government action that treats an organisational form (for example, a voluntary association or a 
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‘purpose’ of a corporation is not found in its type (for example, charitable, 
proprietary, etc). Nevertheless, at the time of Chief Justice Marshall’s decision there 
were already well-known business enterprises with corporate forms, mainly in Britain 
where royal or parliamentary charters were required to deal in lucrative ventures 
involving exploration or foreign trade, or in activities that involved charging tolls and 
fees for the provision of public roads, water and sewer systems, etc. For most of the 
17th and 18th centuries outside these arenas there were few advantages for business 
enterprises to seeking corporate status (which were costly to procure and often 
restrictive) and a good many non-corporate enterprises, operating along the lines of 
the joint-stock company model emerging out of Italy, thrived.  
A turning point came in 1719 when the British Parliament passed the 
infamous Bubble Act,35 which required enterprises that ‘presumed to act as a 
corporation’ to either seek a charter, or face legal action as ‘public nuisances’.36 That 
Act was terminated in 1735, and during the period between the 1730s and 1844 a 
number of changes took place that would eventually result in the Companies Act of 
that year as well as related legislation applicable to banking.37 At that point the 
benefits of incorporation — especially the cover it provided shareholders through 
limited liability — became extremely attractive and the rush was on in the United 
Kingdom, and eventually in the US where several states enacted favourable laws of 
incorporation. 
                                                
labour union) as a distinct corporate entity: see Editorial, ‘Incorporation by Implication under the 
Sherman Act’ (1917) 30 Harvard Law Review 263. 
35 Formally the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation Act of 1719. The law went into 
effect in 1720, a few weeks before the ‘South Sea Bubble’ fiasco that it is associated with took place. 
36 Margaret Patterson and David Reiffen, ‘The Effect of the Bubble Act on the Market for Joint Stock 
Shares’ (1990) 50 The Journal of Economic History 163, 167–71. 
37 Frank Evans, ‘The Evolution of the English Joint Stock Limited Trading Company’ (1908) 8 
Columbia Law Review 339; Frank Evans, ‘The Evolution of the Joint-Stock Limited Trading 
Company: VII Trading Companies Incorporated under General Act of Parliament’ (1908) 8 Columbia 
Law Review 461. 
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Despite the transformation of the corporation into a form most often 
associated with business enterprises today, in terms of ‘purpose’ it retains its 
association with its historical roots reflected in Chief Justice Marshall’s definition. 
But where do those roots lead? 
 
B Inventing the Corporate Form 
While no less an authority than Blackstone had attributed the invention of the 
corporation to the Romans,38 our corporate (canonical-Italian-English) hybrid has 
comparatively modern (or at least late medieval) connections. In tracing the genesis of 
the corporation a century ago, Robert L Raymond offered an evolutionary narrative 
that highlighted the emergence of collectivities in both secular and ecclesiastic 
realms. While initially not recognised in law or by any generalised form of 
governance, these ‘natural’ collectivities39 (for example, towns, convents, villages, 
monasteries, boroughs, guilds) developed into important economic and social 
(religious) actors and key factors in the political dramas that played out in 11th and 
12th century Europe, and especially in England. Their very existence outside the 
dominant legal arrangements of the time, argued Raymond, called for a ‘new legal 
theory’ that would provide a common approach to all the various forms that these 
many-bodies-acting-as-one entities. ‘The oneness had to be given a place in business 
and in law as something definite.’ What eventually emerged was the idea (taken from 
the developing body of canon law) of a ‘fictitious’ or ‘artificial’ person,40 one that 
took an identity in law and governance distinct from the non-fictitious bodies (corpi) 
it included. And thus, as formally recognised through charters and other legal actions, 
the ‘incorporated’ entity was born.  
                                                
38 Maitland, above n 26, 336. 
39 Raymond terms them ‘unit interest or oneness’. 
40 Robert L Raymond, ‘The Genesis of the Corporation’ (1906) 19 Harvard Law Review 350, 359–62. 
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Raymond places so much stress on the natural evolution of the corporate form 
that he overlooks the implications of the early acts of formal recognition, which are 
central to our understanding of the purpose of corporate governance, ie the issuance 
of the first known royal charters to a corporate-like entities (boroughs, towns, guilds), 
particularly by William I and William Rufus, his successor. In a fashion similar to the 
rush to incorporation by businesses in the 19th century, the early charters were sought 
by those collectivities for the protections and rights they bestowed. But it is critical to 
our understanding of ‘purpose’ to note that these charters were granted in name of the 
sovereign within the context of newly emerging form of governance initiated under 
William I and developed under his successors. In fact, if there was a watershed event 
that punctuated the evolution of the modern corporation in its early stages, it was the 
form of accountable governance created in 1086 at Salisbury, when William I 
convened a meeting of representatives from all segments of his English realm and 
required of them an oath of fealty.  
The historical importance and distinctiveness of that event must be understood 
in context. The 11th century was a time of considerable political turmoil. The collapse 
of the Holy Roman Empire had created a political void, and the Papal state in Rome 
had yet to consolidate its hold on power. Authority over both ecclesiastic and 
temporal matters throughout Europe had ontologically and practically devolved to the 
level of feudal lords, rendering the old political order weakened and leaving open 
opportunities for expansion and conquest by the strongest among the lesser nobility. 
This was the setting in which William, Duke of Normandy, pursued his claim to the 
throne of England based on a promise made by Edward the Confessor and the support 
of the papacy. Having succeeded at Hastings, he faced the task of: (1) subduing (and 
often replacing) the defeated but still powerful Anglo-Saxon lords; (2) making good 
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on his promise to Rome that he would regain control of ecclesiastic affairs in 
England; (3) satisfying the desires of his Norman supporters for the spoils of war; and 
(4) legitimising his rule in a land where the foundations and traditions of governance 
ran counter to his interests. Unless he succeeded in dealing with these pressures, he 
would go down in history as just another invader from northern Europe who had 
landed, conquered and left a minor mark on the British Isles. William I effectively 
had three options for dealing with these problems: extended conquest (force of arms); 
oaths; and charters. He put all three approaches to use. After 20 years of consolidating 
his rule of England mainly through force of arms that extracted pledges of fidelity 
from the most recalcitrant among his new subjects, he turned to a different type of 
oath in 1086, just a year before his death. In English law,41 the tradition of fealty oaths 
was long standing42 and there was a requirement that all ‘free men’ pledge to a lord. 
What was controversial about William I’s approach was the claim for such a pledge 
directly to the king. Moreover, as significant was that the Salisbury Oath was pledged 
immediately after the completion of the Domesday census, which had effectively 
given legible form43 to the size and content of the English realm that William I had 
conquered and ruled. Thus this oath involved more than a pledge of fidelity; it also 
included an acknowledgment of the Norman king’s claim to sovereignty over 
everything within his realm.44 To an important degree, the oath taken at Salisbury 
established a reciprocal relationship between the modern central secular ruler and the 
ruled. In seeking the oath, William I was effectively acknowledging the reality that 
                                                
41 William I and his successors made a point in their own coronation oaths and other known statements 
that they planned to honour the ‘law of King Edward’ the Confessor, and thus explicitly adopted the 
pledge requirement and similar practices. 
42 Patrick Wormald, ‘Engla Lond: The Making of an Allegiance’ (1994) 7 Journal of Historical 
Sociology 1. 
43 On the significance of ‘legibility’ in governance, see James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How 
Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998). 
44 On the nature and use of oaths in late medieval and early modern times, see John Spurr, ‘A Profane 
History of Early Modern Oaths’ (2001) 11 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 37. 
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his rule depended on the deference and cooperation of his subjects, many of whom 
could (and sometimes did) operate as autonomous ‘free men’.45 As de facto 
autonomous agents pledging fealty to the king, the subjects accepted the 
responsibility granted by the crown for those parts of the realm with which they had 
been entrusted and, in turn, obligated themselves to giving an account of those 
holdings when called upon to do so. They became what Maitland (following Gierke) 
termed ‘right-and-duty-bearing’ subjects,46 and the acceptance by autonomous agents 
of responsibility and obligation to the governing principal marked the birth of 
accountable governance. 
That unique approach carried over into the extended issuance of charters, a 
practice that became increasingly common throughout medieval Europe, especially in 
regards to the legal creation of urban centres as pockets of ‘liberties’ within feudal 
realms.47 Among the examples cited by Berman, the Anglo-Norman charters initiated 
by William I and his successors stood out for the explicit connection to the crown, 
and this approach characterised charters granted to individuals,48 guilds,49 and other 
collectivities. Accountability to the crown was thus a pervasive characteristic of the 
                                                
45 The evidence to support this is found in this history of royal charters granted to markets and guilds 
which indicates quite clearly that the chartering process did not create those entities but rather 
acknowledged and gave them protection and support as ongoing enterprises that could not be ordered 
into or out of existence nor controlled by royal edict or oversight. Markets and other collective 
activities thrived in England and elsewhere despite the attempts of local lords to control them, and they 
would thrive underground or aboveground despite any actions by the even powerful monarchs. 
Chartering was therefore a means for co-opting and gaining some degree of control over autonomous 
agents that would otherwise operate outside the law and pose constant threats to emerging regimes. 
Supporting this view is the fact that early charters were given to ongoing enterprises and more often 
than not contained provisions that were facilitating nurturing rather than controlling and restrictive: R 
H Britnell, ‘English Markets and Royal Administration before 1200’ (1978) 31 Economic History 
Review 183; Gary Richardson, ‘Guilds, Laws, and Markets for Manufactured Merchandise in Late-
Medieval England’ (2004) 41 Explorations in Economic History 1. 
46 The phrase is cited in Dewey, above n 5, 565 and throughout. 
47 Berman, above n 24, 363–90. 
48 David C Douglas, ‘A Charter of Enfeoffment under William the Conqueror’ (1927) 42 English 
Historical Review 245. 
49 Cyril O’Donnell, ‘Origins of the Corporate Executive’ (1952) 26 Bulletin of the Business Historical 
Society 55. 
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English charters that formed the instrumental foundation for the modern corporate 
form. 
This connection between the birth of accountable governance and the 
embryonic corporate form found in those charters is critical to understanding the 
‘purpose’ that forms our standard for assessing policies and laws related to corporate 
governance. The corporation is more than a mere artificial person or an association of 
shareholders. In the Anglo-Norman tradition it exists as an ‘accountable’ institution, 
in the sense of it being an autonomous agent defined by its responsibilities and 
obligations to the sovereign entity that is its principal.50 
 
III CLARIFYING THE STANDARD 
Viewing the creation of the corporate form in this way — that is, as an 
accountable institution — adds a core, defining dimension to the traditional definition 
of the modern business corporation, and establishes a perspectively useful standard of 
purpose for the assessment of corporate governance reform. Typically characterised 
for analytic purposes as an artificial or fictional legal entity (reflecting the 
ecclesiastic roots) comprised of shareholding owners (the Genoan tradition) and 
committed to some collective goal (in the English tradition of making a profit for its 
owners, providing public conveyance for its constituents/customers, etc), we can now 
add its inherent condition as an accountable (rights-and-duties-bearing) institution. 
Put in direct terms, by granting a corporate charter to an enterprise, the state has 
effectively determined (or at least declared) that the entity is ‘fit to be held 
responsible’ (for example, to be called to account) for its actions and activities.51 The 
                                                
50 This view of accountable governance is further developed in Melvin J Dubnick, Situating 
Accountability (2007). 
51 See Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (2001) for the 
philosophical basis of my approach. 
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‘purpose’ of corporate governance, therefore, is to maintain and sustain that fitness 
for accountability, and it is credible to regard the purpose of corporate governance 
reform — what we regard as ‘assessable’ for the present task — to be the protection 
and enhancement of that fitness. Seen in this light, we are able to demarcate and 
differentiate the view of corporate governance that emerges from the English 
‘accountability’ tradition and those of its historical alternatives. For present purposes 
we will label those alternatives the ‘stakeholder’ and ‘fiduciary’ models. 
 
A The Stakeholder Model 
Today’s consensus view of corporate governance in the business and finance 
literature (especially in the US) takes its cue from the narrow conceptualisation of 
‘principals’ derived from the Genoan joint-stock company tradition, and has been 
expressed by one source as the ‘ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’.52 The problem of corporate 
governance, in this view, is how owners and others who provide capital for the 
corporate entity shape, direct, regulate, etc the operations of the agency or firm to 
enhance the probability that they will receive some value from their financial effort.53 
It is governance by investors and financiers and for investors and financiers. 
At the heart of many discussions of corporate governance based on the 
stakeholder model was the controversy initiated in 1932 with the publication of Berle 
and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property.54 Observing a growing 
problem of distance between ownership and management, their analysis helped define 
the central issues of corporate governance in terms of how to get the 
                                                
52 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of 
Finance 737, 737. 
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management/agents to follow the wishes of the owner/principals.55 One result is a 
myopic approach to corporate governance that has turned into conventional wisdom 
among students of business enterprises.56 That this myopia afflicts the model’s critics 
as well is evident in the many reform efforts that seek to make the corporation more 
‘responsible’, by either broadening the definition of relevant stakeholders, or 
modifying corporate decision rules to include socially responsible actions.57 
 
B The Fiduciary Model 
For those following the canonical law tradition, the focus shifts from 
stakeholders (narrowly defined by their financial stake) to the corporate entity itself. 
Governance in this model is driven by fiduciary responsibilities for the current and 
future well-being of the artificial entity that has legal status as a corporate person. In 
contrast to governance by and for financial stakeholders, those who govern in this 
model are required to put aside personal interests and concerns — those of the 
shareholders as well as their own — in order to act on behalf of the well-being of the 
collectivity (the ‘oneness’) itself.58 
The importance of this distinction from the financial stakeholder model is 
exemplified in the case of the proposed ‘Hershey Company’ sale in 2002. The 
                                                
55 Cf Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around 
the World’ (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471. 
56 The book led a charmed and influential life for nearly half a century, with only scattered and 
intermittent studies to counter its major claims and dominance. However that changed with publication 
of a special symposium on the book published in 1983: see, eg, Robert Hessen, ‘The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 273; 
Douglass C North, ‘Comment on Stigler and Friedland, “The Literature of Economics: The Case of 
Berle and Means”’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 269; George J Stigler and Claire 
Friedland, ‘The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 237. 
57 Archie B Carroll, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct’ (1999) 38 
Business and Society 268; Archie B Carroll, ‘The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward 
the Moral Management or Organizational Stakeholders’ (1991) 34 Business Horizons 39; Richard J 
Klonoski, ‘Foundational Considerations in the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate’ (1991) 34 
Business Horizons 9. 
58 Cf Katsuhito Iwai, ‘The Nature of the Business Corporation: Its Legal Structure and Economic 
Functions’ (2002) 53 Japanese Economic Review 243. 
  
The GovNet eJournal 
Dec 2007 vol. 1 no. 2 
158 
fiduciary obligations of the corporate entity that held controlling interest in the firm 
(the Hershey School Trust, a charitable enterprise established by the founder of the 
Company) required it (or at least those making decisions for the Trust) to offer its 30+ 
per cent stake in the Company for sale. In response to severe criticism from other 
Company shareholders and other stakeholders, the Trust’s managers held that, despite 
their own personal sympathies and views, their hands were effectively tied by the 
legal (fiduciary) responsibility; they had to do what was best for the Trust itself. Only 
the successful issuance of a legal injunction requested by the State of Pennsylvania 
halted the sale, but this episode highlighted the difference between the governance 
models derived from the two traditions.59 
 
C The Accountability Model 
Corporate governance in the accountability tradition of the English model 
stands simultaneously separate to and ‘above’ (in the inclusive sense) that of the 
stakeholder and fiduciary forms. It is distinct from the joint-stock company form in 
putting the interests of stakeholders (financial and otherwise) in a secondary (albeit, 
not unimportant) position to that of a ‘higher principal’ (for example, the sovereign, 
public interest, public good). What distinguishes it from the legalistic canonical 
(fiduciary) model is the status it gives the corporate entity as an active ‘rights-and-
duty-bearing’ (albeit artificial) person.60 The English model corporation, in other 
                                                
59 For details, see Jennifer L Komoroski, ‘The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify: Redefining the State 
Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify’ (2004) 45 William and Mary Law 
Review 1769; another interesting case — also involving a Pennsylvania trust — involves the Barnes 
Foundation: see Ilana H Eisenstein, ‘Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation 
and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts’ (2003) 151 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1747. 
60 The French term for such a corporate entity — personne morale — captures, or at least implies, the 
core sense of the model. 
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words, has more than passive legal standing; it possesses a ‘franchise’ to take action, 
in the classic sense of that term, as: 
a right, privilege, or power, of public concern, which cannot be exercised by private 
individuals at their will, but must be secured by grant, in some form, from the 
sovereign power of the territory in which it is to be exercised. It carries with it an 
assurance of right of user, similar in character to grants of other rights and things, 
and there is a reciprocal agreement on the part of the grantee to use it in accord with 
public policy.61 
 
The often-cited James Kent Commentaries on law is even more explicit on the 
obligation of the incorporated franchisee to actively pursue its authorised tasks. The 
grant of a franchise in the form of corporate standing contains ‘an implied covenant 
on the part of the government not to invade the rights vested, and on the part of the 
grantees to execute the conditions and duties prescribed in the grant’.62  
The governance of such a franchise requires at minimum a process that 
assures the entity’s ongoing commitment to chartered functions and tasks, as well as 
the capacity to give an account to those among it principals who seek such. From this 
view, concerns for stakeholder interests and/or fiduciary responsibilities to the 
collective well-being can be added, but in its most fundamental form corporate 
governance must meet the standard of accountability. It follows that any effort at 
corporate governance reform should be assessed in light of the accountability-purpose 
standard, if for no other reason than to determine how far the corporate form has 
become distanced from its historical purpose. No doubt, most contemporary attempts 
to regulate or change corporate governance reflect an indifference to the 
accountability standard. The preoccupation with shareholder and stakeholder rights 
and control, for example, has driven much of the intermittent reform focused on 
corporate management practices in the US and elsewhere.63 A concern with 
                                                
61 Charles W Needham, ‘Franchises’ (1915) 15 Columbia Law Review 97, 98. 
62 James Kent, Commentaries, quoted in Needham, above n 61, 98. 
63 Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences and Reform’ (Financial Sector 
Discussion Paper, World Bank, 1999); Rafael La Porta at al, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate 
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traditional fiduciary responsibility (that is, to the interests of the corporate entity itself 
rather than its ‘owners’ or creditors) had faded somewhat with the elevation of 
shareholders to sole role of principal,64 but it has made a comeback in recent years in 
calls for a shift away from shareholder value and toward increasing corporate value65 
and enhancing corporate trust and integrity.66 While these reform efforts and 
proposals can be assessed on their own terms, what we are seeking here is to apply the 
accountability standard. 
When assessing pre-Sarbanes-Oxley reform efforts, therefore, the issues could 
be put retrospectively in positive or negative terms. In a positive sense, the question to 
be asked is whether (and how) the reform efforts enhance or strengthen the 
accountability aspect of governance; in the negative, the assessment would focus on 
whether and how the reform efforts weaken accountability. Sarbanes-Oxley, however, 
offers a distinct opportunity to assess corporate governance reforms that were 
intended to enhance the reputation of corporate enterprises as accountable institutions 
in the historical sense. The crises that emerged from the scandals at Enron and other 
enterprises required some action — symbolic or otherwise67 — to counter their 
delegitimising impact. But the circumstances surrounding this flurry of corporate 
difficulties called for more than readjustments in how firms would handle stakeholder 
                                                
Governance’ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 3; Rafael La Porta et al, ‘Investor Protection 
and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 Journal of Finance 1147. 
64 Austin W Scott, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ (1949) 37 California Law Review 539; Lawrence E 
Mitchell, ‘The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations’ (1990) 138 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1675; Lawrence E Mitchell, ‘Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law’ (1993) 43 Duke Law 
Journal 425. 
65 Thomas A Smith, ‘The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty’ (1999) 98 Michigan Law Review 214. 
66 David B Farber, ‘Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?’ (2005) 80 
Accounting Review 539; John Roberts, ‘Trust and Control in Anglo-American Systems of Corporate 
Governance: The Individualizing and Socializing Effects of Processes of Accountability’ (2001) 54 
Human Relations 1547. 
67 Charles Conrad, ‘The Illusion of Reform: Corporate Discourse and Agenda Denial in the 2002 
“Corporate Meltdown”’ (2003) 7 Rhetoric and Public Affairs 311; Justin O’Brien, ‘The Politics of 
Symbolism: Sarbanes-Oxley in Context’ in Paul U Ali and Greg N Gregoriou (eds), International 
Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley (2006). 
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or fiduciary issues. For the first time since at least the Great Depression it was the 
accountable nature of the corporate form that was at issue. How well did Sarbanes-
Oxley measure up to that challenge? 
 
IV ASSESSING ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK 
Despite its popular association with performance measures, there is no known 
metric for accountable governance.68 Nevertheless, it is possible to identify various 
forms of accountability-relevant relationships that can provide the basis for 
comparison and assessment of governance mechanisms and proposals for reform. To 
accomplish this I apply a framework developed in an earlier paper69 that allows us to 
categorise policies and their implementation into four types or relationships involving 
account-giving. The four types range from those impacting directly on the behaviour 
of account-giver, to those that operate at the level of moral suasion. They are 
presented here as four distinct ‘orders’ of accountability. 
First order (‘performative’) accountability entails a situation requiring 
explicit and direct acts of account-giving. Such ‘speech acts’70 typically require at 
least two parties — an account-giver who is doing the account-giving, and an 
account-receiver who is the intended target of that act. The fact that account-giving is 
                                                
68 There have been efforts to assess the quality of performance measures and measurement systems 
(see, eg, D L Poole et al, ‘Evaluating Performance Measurement Systems in Nonprofit Agencies: The 
Program Accountability Quality Scale (PAQS)’ (2000) 21 American Journal of Evaluation 15) and 
some attempts to establish indicators for types of accountability mechanisms (see, eg, Stephen Page, 
‘Measuring Accountability for Results in Interagency Collaboratives’ (2004) 64 Public Administration 
Review 591), but these fall short of measures of accountability per se. Part of the problem is the lack of 
a clear conceptualisation or theory of accountability: see Dubnick, Situating Accountability, above n 
50; Melvin J Dubnick, ‘Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the Mechanisms’ 
(2005) 27 Public Performance and Management Review 376; Melvin J Dubnick, Seeking Salvation for 
Accountability (2002). 
69 Melvin J Dubnick, ‘Orders of Accountability’ (Speech delivered at the World Ethics Forum: 
Leadership, Ethics and Integrity in Public Life, Oxford, 2006). 
70 On the social nature of speech acts, see John L Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1975); John R 
Searle, ‘Meaning and Speech Acts’ (1962) 71 Philosophical Review 423; P F Strawson, ‘Intention and 
Convention in Speech Acts’ (1964) 73 Philosophical Review 439; John R Searle, Speech Acts: An 
Essay in the Philosophy of Language (1969). 
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an action unto itself — not merely a statement about something, but a ‘doing’ per se 
— makes it what linguists and philosophers call a performative act;71 hence the 
appellation performative accountability. To designate it as such does not imply that it 
is a meaningless or vacuous act — on the contrary, as is the case with other 
performatives such as ‘I promise’ or ‘I bid’ or ‘I bet’, the awkward ‘I account for’ has 
some force and meaning within a given context. 
At its most basic and informal, performative account-giving can overlap with 
the social act of ‘reason giving’ recently highlighted in the work of Charles Tilly. 
Humans are reason seeking/giving animals, Tilly asserts, and we engage in various 
forms of reason giving in a range of social relationships from the most mundane (eg, 
practices of etiquette) to the unfathomable (eg, attempting to comprehend the events 
of 9/11 as they occurred).72 But despite a fundamental similarity in form as well as a 
degree of overlap, the defining line between reason giving and account-giving is 
crossed where the account-giver is assumed/perceived to be ‘responsible’ to the 
account-receiver for the condition, action, or event that is the focus on the 
relationship. 
In most scholarly examinations of first order account-giving, stress is placed 
on its role as a functional and appropriate reaction to some error or faux pas, and thus 
most analyses concentrate on the social conventions for making excuses or offering 
justifications.73 Although such mitigatory and explanatory first order acts of account-
giving are common place, they often overshadow equally important purposes for 
engaging in them, as found in information-generating (monitoring, surveilling) forms 
such as bookkeeping, reporting, responding to audits, subjecting oneself to inspection, 
                                                
71 John R Seale, ‘How Performatives Work’ (1989) 12 Linguistics and Philosophy 535; Austin, above 
n 70. 
72 Charles Tilly, Why? (2006); Charles Tilly, ‘Reasons Why’ (2004) 22 Sociological Theory 445. 
73 Marvin B Scott and Stanford M Lyman, ‘Accounts’ (1968) 33 American Sociological Review 46. 
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etc.74 In all these instances, the acts of account-giving — whether in the form of 
publishing an annual or quarterly report, issuing a press release, giving testimony at a 
trial or before a legislative committee, offering a public apology, providing a written 
elaboration of reasons for taking actions, releasing or posting of transcripts — are 
responses to a direct (although sometimes implied or perceived) solicitation from real 
or potential account-receivers. The solicitation can take the form of a speeding ticket 
issued by a police officer, a reporter’s microphone placed in front of one’s mouth, a 
demand by an auditor to see one’s books, a phone call from one’s supervisor seeking 
an explanation for some action, a public accusation, etc. In each case the effort is to 
generate a performative response from the account-giver.  
But not all accountability is performative. Most forms of accountability in fact 
occur in anticipation (sometimes anxious anticipation) of the need or requirement to 
engage in performative accountability. They relate, in other words, to a ‘presumptive 
account-giver’.  
Second order (‘regulatory’) accountability, for example, does not involve 
direct and explicit account-giving, but is instead manifest in following the guidance, 
rules and operating standards of the presumptive account-giver’s task environment. 
This is regulatory accountability and it makes use of the potential ‘threat’ of being 
called to performative account to establish and maintain restrictive and directive 
control over the account-giver. 
In a widely discussed work on the nature of cyberspace, Lessig takes note of 
four major mechanisms that society relies on to constrain or limit behaviour, 
including law, social norms, the marketplace and the ‘architecture’ of the operating 
                                                
74 Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior (1967); Herbert Kaufman, 
Administrative Feedback: Monitoring Subordinates’ Behavior (1973). 
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environment.75 Of those four,76 law and architecture generate second order 
accountability by creating operating environments in which the possibility of some 
form performative account-giving plays a significant role in shaping and directing the 
behaviour of agents. The use of law as a basis for regulatory accountability is well-
documented both historically77 and in contemporary analyses of requirements related 
to rule of law standards.78 Lessig’s major contribution has been to highlight the role of 
task environment ‘architecture’ in the regulatory endeavour. This architecture — 
which Lessig notes is manifest in the ‘code’ of everything from computer programs to 
constitutions — determines such things as access and the range of 
discretion/autonomy an individual has while operating in the constructed 
environment. It obviously places various checks on the range of choices or decisions 
that an accountable individual can make, but it also functions as a rationale for 
constrained or directed behaviour. Thus, if called upon to provide an account for his 
or her behaviour (that is, to engage in first order accountability), the person who 
operates within the architecture would refer to its rules, parameters, SOPs, etc.79 
Underlying all this is the belief that first order, performative accountability would be 
triggered if an individual was found to be challenging or violating the code. 
In contrast, rather than focusing on the control of conduct, third order 
(‘managerial’) accountability relies on account-giving as a means of eliciting 
                                                
75 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999). 
76 Challenges or violations to social norms would more likely call for reliance on what Tilly calls 
‘reason giving’ (Tilly, Why?, above n 72), and the price mechanisms of the marketplace operate within 
the context of law to deal with any problems. On the latter point, it is relevant that Lessig did not 
include the marketplace in his first examination of such mechanisms: see Lawrence Lessig, ‘Open 
Code and Open Societies: Values and Internet Governance’ (1998–2000) 74 Chicago–Kent Law 
Review 1405. 
77 Deirdre D von Dornum, ‘The Straight and the Crooked: Legal Accountability in Ancient Greece’ 
(1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 1483. 
78 David H Rosenbloom, Administrative Law for Public Managers (2003); Joseph Sanders, V Lee 
Hamilton and Toshikyuki Yuasa, ‘The Institutionalization of Sanctions for Wrongdoing inside 
Organizations: Public Judgements in Japan, Russia, and the United States’ (1998) 32 Law and Society 
Review 871; Arthur L Stinchcombe, When Formality Works: Authority and Abstraction in Law and 
Organizations (2001). 
79 See also the discussion of codes in reason-giving in Tilly, Why?, above n 72, ch 4. 
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purposive behaviour. Accountability in this sense is intended to be motivational rather 
than regulatory, and in that sense the term managerial accountability80 seems most 
appropriate.81 The logic is simple: the measure or assessment of an action or condition 
for which the account-giver is assumed ‘responsible’ is, under the right conditions, 
regarded as an effective means for motivating that individual to improve that action or 
condition in the future. Under third order accountability, the focus is on designing 
task environment conditions (again, architectures) that facilitate those motivations 
rather than control or constrain them. Thus, we see the extensive use of incentives and 
sanctions in third order accountability.82 
While second order (regulatory) and third order (managerial) accountability 
operates primarily through the architecture and machinations of task environments, 
fourth order (‘embedded’) accountability operates through the norms and values of 
the account-giver — through what Foucauldians designate as ‘governmentality’.83 We 
will use the label embedded accountability to stress the internalisation of the sense of 
                                                
80 Not long ago the concept of ‘managerial accountability’ would have been more closely associated 
with regulation and control: see E S Mason, ‘The Apologetics of “Managerialism”’ (1958) 31 Journal 
of Business 1; Lee E Preston and James E Post, ‘The Third Managerial Revolution’ (1974) 17 Academy 
of Management Journal 476. 
81 John Dixon, Alexander Kouzmin and Nada Korac-Kakabadse, ‘Managerialism — Something Old, 
Something Borrowed, Little New: Economic Prescription Versus Effective Organizational Change in 
Public Agencies’ (1998) 11 International Journal of Public Sector Management 164; A J Fowles, 
‘Changing Notions of Accountability: A Social Policy View’ (1993) 6 Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal 97; Mark Lyons, ‘The Impact of Managerialism on Social Policy: The Case of 
Social Services’ (1998) 21 Public Productivity and Management Review 419; Heinz-Dieter Meyer, 
‘The New Managerialism in Education Management: Corporatization or Organizational Learning?’ 
(2002) 40 Journal of Educational Administration 534; Stephen Page, ‘The Web of Managerial 
Accountability: The Impact of Reinventing Government’ (2006) 38 Administration and Society 166. 
82 Third order accountability is central to what I have called the ‘promises of accountability’ in other 
papers: see, eg, Melvin J Dubnick, ‘Accountability and Ethics: Reconsidering the Relationships’ 
(2003) 6 International Journal of Organization Theory and Behaviour 405; Dubnick, ‘Accountability 
and the Promise of Performance’, above n 68. These promises relate to a number of socially desirable 
ends, ranging from justice and democracy to ethical behaviour and enhanced performance in the 
production of goods and service. Despite its simple logic, however, the value and validity of 
managerial accountability remains an empirical question. 
83 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies of Governmentality: With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michael 
Foucault (1991); Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of 
Government’ (1992) 43 British Journal of Sociology 173; Nikolas S Rose, Powers and Freedom: 
Reframing Political Thought (1999); Nikolas Rose, ‘Government and Control’ (2000) 40 British 
Journal of Criminology 321. 
  
The GovNet eJournal 
Dec 2007 vol. 1 no. 2 
166 
‘moral responsibility’ characteristic of this form, and take special note at this point of 
its association with professionalism and high levels of commitment to living up to 
perceived expectations. 
 
V ASSESSING SARBANES-OXLEY 
Fourth order accountability stands as both foundational and aspirational in the 
present situation. On the one hand, once in place as the values and norms of corporate 
governance — that is, once embedded in the corporate culture of a firm — it can 
shape and direct the use of performative, regulatory and managerial accountabilities. 
On the other hand, establishing an embedded fourth order accountability is an 
extremely challenging task, perhaps on par with Plato’s strategy for creating his 
Republic. Optimistically, one can imagine policies that reward corporations for 
developing and fostering corporate cultures that give priority to accountable 
governance standards.84 But others would argue that the effort would require not 
merely changes in policies related to corporate governance, but a wholesale (and 
unlikely) transformation of legal ontology under which the Anglo-American system 
operates.85 
As it happens, the agendas for most corporate governance reform efforts are 
aimed at lower aspirations than creating corporate forms that are in sync with the 
accountability model. Requiring automobile manufacturers to meet set standards for 
average fuel economy on their vehicles reflects a first order (performative) solution to 
the problem of having those firms act responsibly. Often reform policies aim at 
improving performance by modifying the regulatory regime in which they have to 
                                                
84 See, eg, Stone, above n 2. 
85 See the interesting analysis offered in Kitagawa, above n 6. Japan’s experience with modern 
corporate law speaks to many of the issues now raised about globalisation and its impact, particularly 
in light of the hegemony of the Anglo-American legal cultures. 
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operate. Deregulation of the airlines, buses and other forms of interstate public 
transportation can be regarded as shifting the second order accountability (regulatory) 
regime toward the open market, with the unfettered firms having to deal with a 
different set of account-giving relationships. Modifications in policies regarding the 
taxation and reporting of executive compensation and benefits can and have had 
impacts on third order (managerial) accountability decisions. In each of these cases, 
the different orders of accountability have modified some aspect of corporate 
decision-making. 
But in the wake of the corporate scandals at Enron, WorldCom, etc, the 
agenda for corporate reform expanded and rose to the level of the goals implied in the 
accountable governance model. However, short of a miraculous transformation in the 
legal ontology of Anglo-American corporate operations through fourth order reforms 
that alter the existing ‘governmentality’, reforms would have to come through policies 
based on the lower order approaches. In that sense, there is a need for a Sarbanes-
Oxley-like initiative that contains provisions that at least push in that direction. The 
immediate question is whether Sarbanes-Oxley is such an initiative. The answer is 
clearly no. 
 
A The Performative Provisions 
Sarbanes-Oxley contains 69 sections, with about two-thirds having some 
provisions that relate to a type of accountability relationship. Due to the necessary 
formalisms required of such a statute, some sections were definitional, others were 
redundant in regard to the substance of their accountability provisions (for example, 
Title XI sections contained authorisations for actions to enforce previous sections), 
and still others contained provisions that were not related to our task.  
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Of what remained, there were 17 provisions for what can be termed first order 
accountability mandates; that is, they detailed an action (for example, a filing of a 
disclosure, the development of an ethics code) that had to be taken by some actor. Of 
those, nine were aimed at external actors whose activities impacted (directly or 
indirectly) on the corporation. Of these nine, seven related to accounting firms hired 
to serve as auditors of the company. The other two required actions by outside 
attorneys and the security analysis industry. The remaining eight first order provisions 
involved mostly disclosure and reporting requirements. Two of the disclosure 
requirements were general in nature, requiring complete (s 401) and quick (s 409) 
reporting. An additional two were targeted at specific officers, with s 302 requiring 
CEO and CFO certification of annual financial reports and s 1001 (which was a sense 
of the Senate provision) strongly suggesting that the CEO sign the corporate income 
tax filings. 
Four additional disclosure provisions were actually indirect mandates that 
would clearly have third order effects. Section 407, for example, requires a report that 
confirms that at least one member of the audit committee is a financial expert, with 
the obvious implication for recruiting such an individual. Section 406 requires a 
similar disclosure about a corporate code of ethics for financial offices, again 
impacting on managerial operations. Section 403, seeking disclosure of personal 
financial transactions by corporate officers and major shareholders, would require the 
development of relevant tracking and reporting mechanisms. But perhaps the most 
significant provisions with secondary consequences among the disclosure requirement 
are found in s 404, which mandates reports on the operations and effectiveness of the 
firm’s ‘internal control structure and procedures for … financial reporting.’ The 
development and operations of such mechanisms (if they did not already exist) have 
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recently been noted as the most costly and problematic of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirements.86 
Regarding these various first order provisions, there seems only the faintest 
relationship between them and objective of re-establishing accountable governance. 
Implied in some provisions (for example, the CEO/CFO signoffs; the code of ethics 
for financial managers; the development of effective internal control systems) is the 
assumption that such legal requirements will make it clear to the affected officials that 
they have moral obligations that go beyond their own self-interest or even those of the 
firm’s shareholders and stakeholders. Whether there are connections between these 
requirements and fourth order (embedded accountability) effects involves empirical 
questions that might prove difficult to answer in the short term. 
 
B The Regulatory Provisions 
Sarbanes-Oxley also contains 21 provisions that can be categorised as second 
order accountability actions. Six are found in Title I of the Act which relates to the 
establishment and authority of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a 
non-profit entity that deals directly with the outside accounting firms the serve that 
audit needs of the corporations. In addition, three other sections (201, 202, 906) 
contain regulatory provisions related to the outside auditors. In fact, in Title II of the 
Act, only s 206 relates directly to the firm by prohibiting the hiring of officers who 
had worked for those outside auditors during the previous year. The remaining 11 
second order provisions are scattered among the other Titles and range from 
determining the composition of corporate audit committees (s 301), to prohibiting the 
extension of credit to firm officers, or direct (s 402) to protections for whistle blowers 
                                                
86 Tackett, Wolf and Claypool, ‘Internal Control under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Critical Examination’, 
above n 20; Carney, above n 21. 
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and informants (ss 806 and 1007). Among the most important of these second order 
accountability provisions are those that extend and enhance the criminalisation of 
malfeasant behaviour of corporate officers (see, eg, ss 807, 906). 
Once again we are confronted with questions about the assumed link between 
these second order provisions and the objective of developing an embedded sense of 
moral obligation among corporate agents. Given the details of these sections, the 
desire for retribution and restoration may have taken priority over any intent to 
change the moral commitments and behaviour of corporate officials. But assuming 
that long-term moral and behavioural change was part of the design, there seems little 
in the law that addresses the potential for the hazards (moral and cognitive) associated 
with regulatory actions.87 
 
C Managerial Provisions and the Absence of Fourth Order Provisions 
In addition to the third order actions implied in the disclosure provisions of ss 
404, 406 and 407 (noted above), Sarbanes-Oxley contains only one accountability-
relevant provision that is somewhat managerial. According to s 304, if the firm’s 
reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission are determined to be non-
compliant, the firm’s major officers (CEO, CFO) must forfeit bonuses and other 
compensation rewards. It should be noted that at various points in the deliberative 
process, members of Congress offered a number of management-relevant ideas for 
consideration. But opposition to overly intrusive policies won the day, and only s 304 
remained as an explicit managerial provision when Sarbanes-Oxley was finally 
passed. The irony is that, short of some fourth order expression of substantive 
standards to guide corporate decisions, third order managerial provisions might have 
                                                
87 Jonathon Klick and Gregory Mitchell, ‘Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive 
Hazards’ (2006) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1620. 
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enhanced the Act’s promise as a stimulant for accountable governance. As it is, the s 
404 requirements for reporting on the design and effectiveness of internal control of 
financial records has drawn the most reaction from corporations who complain about 
the ambiguities and costs associated with its implementation. 
Finally and most notably, there is no single provision in the legislation that 
can be classified as a fourth order accountability action. There is nothing in Sarbanes-
Oxley to deal directly with the assumed objective of establishing or improving the 
corporation’s purpose as an accountable (‘rights-and-duties-bearing’) institution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Of the many efforts at corporate governance reforms that have emerged in 
recent decades,88 Sarbanes-Oxley stands out as a watershed event in several respects. 
It has clearly been a force in both the nationalisation of US regulation of corporate 
governance89 and the Americanisation of global regulatory regimes.90 And its impact 
on the daily relationships within business environment have certainly been notable, as 
anyone who works in the accounting or securities field can attest to. 
But, because it was drawn up in haste, Sarbanes-Oxley can be seen as a 
missed opportunity in one important respect. It is probably the case that the political 
circumstances of the moment generated as good an effort as might have otherwise 
been expected in a political system that seems addicted to a policymaking-by-crisis 
mode. But a more thoughtful and informed debate might have led to considerations 
about the nature of corporate accountability that have been off the reform agenda for 
                                                
88 Rockness and Rockness, above n 12. 
89 Curtis Alva, ‘Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency’ (1990) 15 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 885; William L Cary, ‘Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware’ (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal 663; Mark J Roe, ‘Delaware’s Competition’ 
(2003) 117 Harvard Law Review 588. 
90 Gates, above n 14; Vagts, above n 15; Hollister, above n 15. 
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at least a century in the US.91 As it now stands, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
their enforcement have generated their own problems,92 and the long postponed 
debate over the role of corporate entities as accountable institutions is likely to be 
extended. 
 
                                                
91 However, additional time and deliberation might not have made a difference. In the United Kingdom 
the consideration of corporate governance issues has been taking place for at least a decade, with the 
1992 Cadbury Report often cited as the start of an ongoing debate that has generated a number of 
reports over the past 15 years. Despite this extended debate, the focus remains on stakeholder reform, 
transparency and oversight: see Jill Solomon and Aris Solomon, Corporate Governance and 
Accountability (2004) ch 1. 
92 Justin O’Brien, ‘Securing Corporate Accountability or Bypassing Justice? The Efficiency and 
Pitfalls of Pre-Trial Diversion’ (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 161; Justin O’Brien, 
Redesigning Financial Regulation: The Politics of Enforcement (2007). 
